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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Stephen Subrin’s expansive body of scholarship concerning the 
history, development, and implementation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure has covered vast terrain.1 From this impressive background, he and Pro-
                                                        
*  Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Many thanks to the par-
ticipants of the symposium at Northeastern University School of Law, entitled Through a 
Glass Starkly: Civil Procedure Reassessed, for their thoughtful feedback on the ideas con-
tained in this essay. 
1  See, e.g., Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance 
in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII 
Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992); Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation 
and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 
(2011); Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 299 (2002); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Back-
ground of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998); Stephen N. 
Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Sub-
stance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994) [hereinafter Subrin, Fudge Points]; 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law]; Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive 
Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DEN. U. L. REV. 
377 (2010) [hereinafter Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure]; Stephen N. 
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fessor Thomas Main just last year described how we find ourselves in a new 
“distinct, fourth era” of civil procedure.2 Unlike the first three eras3—namely 
the import of the English common law/equity system,4 the Field Code,5 and the 
advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure6—this fourth era, they opine, is 
difficult to define because there was no public debate, no formal adoption, and 
no official implementation.7 Rather, it is characterized by “back door” efforts 
to cut back on substantive rights by eroding the procedures used to vindicate 
them.8 They provide countless compelling examples, including the Supreme 
Court’s ratcheting up of the pleading standard to the amorphously defined 
“plausibility pleading” as announced in its decisions in Twombly and Iqbal,9 
the burdening of ordinary discovery mechanisms,10 and the increased promi-
nence of summary judgment as a dispute resolution mechanism, particularly 
after the 1986 so-called summary judgment triology.11 
Professors Subrin and Main’s account of the Fourth Era is compelling not 
just in documenting a new paradigm of case resolution, but in critiquing the 
method of its adoption: 
Conspicuously absent from the history of the fourth era of procedure is the 
policy debate that should occur when lawmakers and the public are presented 
with a choice between the competing visions of the third and fourth eras. Proce-
                                                                                                                                
Subrin, Thoughts on Misjudging Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 513 (2007); Stephen N. Subrin, 
Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case 
for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79 (1997). 
2  Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2014). 
3  They admit that there is some debate about whether the prior three eras were each internal-
ly cohesive, but conclude it is appropriate to treat them as such. Id. at 1842 n.11. 
4  Id. at 1842 (noting that on top of merely the importation of English common law and equi-
ty court systems, the U.S. added a layer of federal courts to the mix). 
5  The Field Codes are so named after the New York lawyer David Dudley Field, who cam-
paigned to reform the judicial system in the mid 1800s, leading to the merger of law and eq-
uity and the drive to simplify procedure to eliminate hyper-technicality. See Stephen N. 
Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Proce-
dural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 311, 316–19 (documenting Field’s objectives in re-
forming legal process). 
6  The Federal Rules were adopted in 1938. Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1843. 
7  Id. at 1856–57. 
8  Id. at 1869 (arguing the conservative opposition to social safety net programs may have 
led to various strategies to dismantle them, one of which was an ultimately successful strate-
gy to “undermine the procedural platform upon which substantive rights rely, but to [do] so 
through the back door—incrementally, through judicial decisions”). 
9  Id. at 1848; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
10  Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1849–51 (citing the narrowing of the scope of discovery, 
additional discovery hurdles such as conferences and initial disclosures, and the growth of 
judicial supervision of discovery, all of which have been adopted as supposed solutions to a 
problem of excessive discovery that Subrin and Main explain does not in reality exist in 
most cases). 
11  Id. at 1851 & n.70 (collecting evidence of the expanding role of summary judgment, con-
trary to the intent that it serve as “an exceptional remedy with a very limited role”). 
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dure is power, of course, so the stakes of choosing one over the other produces 
different winners and losers. In a debate, the trade-offs between the two visions 
would be explored, the empirical data gathered, and the interested constituencies 
consulted. Yet that debate never happened. Indeed, it is all-too-fitting that the 
third era itself was denied notice and the right to be heard before it was interred 
by judges.12 
While the rising conservative political ideology of the federal judiciary is an 
easy target for blame in this regard,13 Professors Subrin and Main also docu-
ment a host of practical factors that fueled the Fourth Era, including the growth 
in civil caseloads and corresponding need for case management solutions.14 
This essay explores one aspect of procedural law that might be considered 
a Fourth Era phenomenon: the departure from the transsubstantive design of 
the Federal Rules by judicial decisions that create substance-specific procedure 
operating in their shadow. Notably, like other Fourth Era features, these sub-
stance-specific procedural practices are generated outside the relative transpar-
ency of legislative processes or even federal civil rulemaking procedures. 
Using Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) litigation as an example of 
how the Federal Rules allow and even condone shadow procedure, this Article 
contends that while substance-specific process may be a useful reform in some 
instances, shadow substance-specific procedures lack legitimacy.15 In fact, the 
effect of strict adherence to formal transsubstantivity combined with the judi-
cially created shadow substance-specificity risks driving litigants from the 
courthouse doors to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.16 In this con-
text, the irony Professors Subrin and Main describe in the failure of the Third 
Era to receive its own public hearing of sorts is doubly salient: this non-
transparent shadow procedure affects government transparency itself by hinder-
ing the substantive rights of the public to access government information and 
learn what our government is up to under FOIA.17 
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the origins of 
transsubstantive procedural design and details the mechanisms by which pro-
cedure has departed from that principle in limited ways. Part II delves deeply 
into the process by which courts have created substance-specific procedural 
rules in FOIA litigation. It argues that courts have employed a sort of common 
                                                        
12  Id. at 1856–57 (footnote omitted). 
13  Id. at 1859, 1869–74 (documenting how the rise in conservative legal movements, includ-
ing organizations such as the Federalist Society and the various conservative legal founda-
tions fueled a political shift in the federal judiciary). 
14  Id. at 1860–68. The growth in federal civil cases is attributed in large part to the creation 
of brand-new federal statutory rights and the growth of the legal profession. Id. at 1859. 
Case management solutions took various forms, but mostly in the culture shift toward judi-
cial intervention into case negotiations and settlement, as well as increased accountability for 
individual judges efficiency in moving cases through the federal system. Id. at 1861–63. 
15  See infra Part III.A. 
16  See infra Part III.C. 
17  See infra Part III.B. 
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law approach to FOIA litigation processes, departing in significant aspects 
from the transsubstantive Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part III contends 
that common law substance-specific procedural rules, like the ones used in 
FOIA litigation, implicate important concerns regarding the legitimacy of the 
judiciary, the soundness of the processes, and the impetus for litigants to avoid 
the courthouse altogether. 
I. TRANSSUBSTANTIVITY 
Procedural rules are transsubstantive when they apply to all cases, regard-
less of the substance of the claims.18 That is, the same set of rules will decide 
tort cases arising out of car accidents as will decide civil rights violations as 
will decide corporate contract disputes.19 The modern student of civil proce-
dure will practically take this principle for granted; with limited exceptions, the 
current procedural regime fully embraces transsubstantive procedural design.20 
In fact, however, transsubstantivity was viewed as one of the major 
achievements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.21 At common law, de-
veloped in England and borrowed in the earliest American legal systems, sub-
stance and procedure were inseparable.22 Through a system of writs, each type 
of action had a process for obtaining a particular type of remedy; the substan-
tive rights and remedies available were dependent on the particular proce-
dure.23 
The specificity of the writs and technicalities that often thwarted otherwise 
meritorious claims led to the first prominent set of procedural reforms. In the 
                                                        
18  David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal Civil Pro-
cedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus, Past, Present, and Future]. 
Transsubstantivity has also been used to describe a system that applies the same rules to all 
cases regardless of case size, rather than substantive claim. Subrin, The Limitations of 
Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 378. 
19  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceed-
ings in the United States district courts . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
20  See FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a) (enumerating a limited list of types of proceedings not governed 
by the federal rules, such as bankruptcy, certain admiralty matters, citizenship proceedings). 
As discussed below, there are also departures from the transsubstantive nature of the federal 
rules in particular substantive statutes. See infra notes 37–67 and accompanying text. 
21  See Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 372; see also Robert M. Cover, 
For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 
(1975) (referring to the “ongoing trans-substantive achievement of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure”). 
22  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 382–83. 
23  Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 379. 
The various forms of action [writs] required the pleader to make quite specific and technical al-
legations in his complaint that differed depending on the remedy pursued. The processes that 
followed as a case proceeded varied. The chosen form would determine the nature of the de-
fendant’s responsive pleading, the requirements for service of process, whether a court could en-
ter a default judgment, the form of trial, and the means of executing judgments. General proce-
dural rules did not exist . . . . 
Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 382 (footnotes omitted). 
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mid-1800s, David Dudley Field, a New York lawyer, drafted a code of proce-
dure—widely referred to as the Field Code—later adopted in large measure by 
most American jurisdictions.24 The Field Code championed the notion of sub-
stance as distinct from procedure and embraced the principles of transsubstan-
tivity.25 Implementation of the code, however, failed to live up to its ideal as 
courts often imported common law concepts in interpreting the code and in any 
event adoption of the code remained uneven.26 Substance specificity according-
ly lived on. 
The drafters of the Federal Rules were committed to various ideals for their 
new procedural regime. Central among them were commitments to simplicity 
and avoidance of the technicality of the common law system.27 Transsubstan-
tivity was a logical extension of this goal; having only one set of straightfor-
ward rules was at the heart of the drafters’ strategy to eliminate overly tech-
nical litigation processes.28 In fact, the deliberations of the initial Advisory 
Committee that drafted the Federal Rules included no debate at all about 
whether the same rules would apply to all types of cases.29 Thus, like the Field 
Code, the Federal Rules were designed as transsubstantive, but beyond the 
Field Code, the Rules eliminated all vestiges of language that could be inter-
preted against the backdrop of common law principles.30 Accordingly, the Fed-
eral Rules achieved transsubstantivity not only in theory, but also in practice. 
This achievement, while celebrated by many,31 has certainly not received 
universal acclaim.32 Professor Subrin made an early case for limited substance-
                                                        
24  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18 at 388, 390. At the turn of the twenti-
eth-century, a version of the Field Code had been adopted in twenty-five states and four ter-
ritories. Id. at 390. 
25  Id. at 389–90. In particular, Field believed that transsubstantivity would promote simplici-
ty and thus better implementation of substantive law. Id. at 389. 
26  Id. at 392–93. Many in the profession believed, for instance that “[t]he necessary link be-
tween procedural form and substantive rights . . . rendered trans-substantive procedure im-
possible.” Id. 
27  Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 942–43. 
28  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 394–95. 
29  Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 383. 
30  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 394 (“The Federal Rules left sub-
stance-specific procedure behind by closing the entry points through which the forms of ac-
tion had crept back into the code reforms.”). 
31  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Asser-
tions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2068–69 (1989) (arguing, in favor of transsubstantivity, that the civil 
rulemaking process is ill-suited to the types of political considerations inherent in any sub-
stance-specific rule and that in any case substantive-specific procedural rules are not likely 
to address the problems they may purport to resolve); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery 
Vices and Trans-substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2237, 2238 (1989) (extolling the benefits of transsubstantivity in allowing flexibility 
for the creation of new substantive rights with worry that the procedural system is too rigid 
to accommodate them); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for 
Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 779 (1993) (arguing that “a shift away from 
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specific rules, particularly with respect to discovery.33 Some substantive areas, 
he contended, lend themselves to particular rules about the scope of core dis-
covery, and experts and practitioners in those fields tend to know what a typical 
case requires.34 He also argued that certain case types lend themselves to par-
ticularized rules concerning minimal allegations in the complaint, dependent on 
the amount of detail the plaintiff would be expected to know in a particular sit-
uation.35 In fact, he declared, “[t]he price of trying to apply the same rules to all 
cases inevitably leads to general, vague, and flexible rules; such rules provide 
very little guidance for the bar or bench.”36 
To be sure, perfect adherence to transsubstantive procedure has never been 
truly achieved. Both Congress and state legislatures have enacted substance-
specific procedural rules for certain types of litigation. For instance, Congress 
enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which, among other things, adjusted 
pleading practice, processes for dismissing a complaint, and obligations of a 
defendant to respond.37 Likewise, Congress heightened the pleading standard 
for securities litigation in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995.38 Sometimes Congress has acted to liberalize access to civil litigation on 
a substance-specific basis, too. For instance, several environmental statutes al-
low intervention as of right to join a government enforcement action for citi-
zens who are subject to a so-called “diligent prosecution bar” to bringing their 
own suits, a broader intervention provision than the Federal Rules provide.39 
                                                                                                                                
trans-substantive procedure threatens to create losers of both the [claim] specific and general 
type”). 
32  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The 
Example of Rule 11, 137 PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989) (“No one I know is suggesting a 
return to the forms of action or a wholesale rejection of trans-substantive procedure. Some of 
us, however, are suggesting that it is time both to face facts, in particular the fact that uni-
formity and trans-substantivity rhetoric are a sham, and to find out the facts, in particular the 
facts about discretionary justice.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the 
Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s “Tolstoy Prob-
lem”, 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 78, 84 (1994) (declaring, in a section entitled “Confessions of a 
Recalcitrant Transubstantivist,” that “[t]he creeping growth of transubstantive rules like dis-
closure, rules that increase the burdens on counsel and clients but are predicted not to 
achieve offsetting benefits, persuade me to suggest that introducing case-specific discovery 
guidelines may make civil discovery less complex, less erratic, and easier to administer” 
(footnote omitted)). 
33  Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 1, at 28. 
34  Id. at 47, 48. As examples, Professor Subrin cites products liability, antitrust, securities 
fraud, section 1983, employment discrimination, and malpractice suits. Id. at 48. 
35  Id. at 48. 
36  Id. at 46. 
37  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 405. 
38  Id. at 406. 
39  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(b)(1)(B) (2012); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (2012); see also Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-
substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1501, 1502–03 (1992) (citing these special interven-
tion statutes as an example of the erosion of transsubstantivity). Further modification of the 
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State legislatures across the country have also had occasion to embrace sub-
stance-specificity. Numerous states have enacted specialized procedures for 
medical malpractice cases, including special filing requirements, heightened 
pleading standards, and evidentiary rules.40 These legislative developments 
have been described as “consistent with a retreat from trans-substantivity as a 
foundational principle for American civil procedure.”41 
In contrast, however, Professor David Marcus has demonstrated that 
courts, in exercising their powers to fashion procedural rules, have been re-
markably consistent in their adherence to formal transsubstantivity.42 Notably, 
the civil rulemaking process has resulted in only a handful of Federal Rules 
that are even arguably substance-specific,43 and local rules adopted by federal 
district courts likewise are overwhelmingly transsubstantive.44 We are, it 
seems, a long way from abandoning the principle as a formal matter. 
Although the continued dominance of formally transsubstantive rules can 
be established, there remains the question of whether the rules are applied in a 
transsubstantive manner in practice. For example, Professor Arthur Miller re-
cently claimed that not only do Twombly and Iqbal effectuate a change to the 
pleading standard as enunciated in the Federal Rules, but that with them, “it is 
quite possible that the Court implicitly abandoned or compromised its devotion 
to the transsubstantive character of the Rules.”45 It may have done so, he 
claims, by requiring its new “plausibility” standard to be applied contextually, 
thereby tolerating “divergent applications” of the pleading rule.46 
But pleading is not the only area potentially subject to substance-specific 
applications. One central and inherent weakness of transsubstantive rules is the 
vast discretion it leaves to judges to fashion a process for each individual 
                                                                                                                                
rules of intervention in the environmental context are possible. Both industry and environ-
mental groups have voiced objections to the application of Rule 24 to environmental dis-
putes, see Courtney R. McVean & Justin R. Pidot, Environmental Settlements and Adminis-
trative Law, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 211–13 (2015), and Congress is considering 
legislation that would add a provision to the Endangered Species Act that would provide af-
fected parties a “reasonable opportunity to move to intervene” after the filing of a consent 
decree and further would create a “rebuttable presumption” that the interests of an “affected 
party . . . would not be represented adequately” by the government. S. 19, 113th Cong. 
§ 2(1) (2013). 
40  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 407. 
41  Id. at 409. 
42  Id. at 413. 
43  Professor Marcus reports one count of substance-specific rules within the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure as numbering “only six subsections of the more than ninety Federal 
Rules.” Id. For example, Rule 5.2(c) limits remote access to electronic files in social security 
appeals and immigration cases, and Rule 71.1 details separate procedures for actions to con-
demn property. See id. at 413 n.262 (listing the substance-specific federal rules). 
44  Id. at 414 (reporting that in a survey of ten federal districts, only five percent of all local 
rules “could arguably be deemed substance-specific”). 
45  Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 91 (2010). 
46  Id. at 91–92. 
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case.47 Depending on how this discretion is exercised, it can itself lead to an 
erosion of transsubstantivity through the collective actions of judges and reli-
ance on precedent.48 
As Professor Subrin has demonstrated, transsubstantivity and discretion are 
inherently linked.49 In perhaps his most well known work, How Equity Con-
quered Common Law, Professor Subrin chronicles the history of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and demonstrates that the “underlying philosophy of, 
and procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules were almost universally 
drawn from equity rather than common law.”50 Two of the most important 
ways that equity principles are enshrined in the Federal Rules are the separation 
between procedure and substance (and resulting transsubstantive design) and 
the Rules’ expansive judicial discretion.51 In fact, since cases can differ vastly 
from one another, a failure to afford discretion to judges could, according to 
Professor Marcus, “jeopardize[] the success of a trans-substantive code.”52 And 
other scholars agree: “Necessarily, therefore, trans-substantivism implies a cer-
tain amount of discretion.”53 The result, however, was that by design, specifics 
were left to judges to determine within the broad confines of the Federal 
Rules.54 
Discretion, however, does not automatically lead to substance-specific pro-
cesses. It could simply lead to individualized, ad hoc decision making to 
achieve the best justice possible in each individual case as envisioned by the 
drafters of the rules.55 This type of ad hoc decision making, while it has been 
criticized as representing a departure from transsubstantivity,56 does not inher-
                                                        
47  See id. at 92 (“[T]he vast reservoir of judicial discretion in the application of the Federal 
Rules, coupled with the restraints on appellate review imposed by the final-judgment rule, 
probably undermines the transsubstantivity principle.” (footnote omitted)). 
48  Id. (noting that “[v]iewed realistically, the substance behind the catechism of transsub-
stantivity actually may have been discarded in all but name long before Twombly and Iq-
bal”). 
49  Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 922. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 923–24. Equity principles are also evidenced in the low pleading threshold, liberal 
joinder, expansive discovery, flexible remedies, judicial control over juries, and other as-
pects. Id. 
52  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 396. 
53  Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of 
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1747 (1992). 
54  Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 1, at 942. “The drafters of the 
Federal Rules recognized that the system they were creating lacked restraint.” Id. at 975. 
55  Indeed, as Professor Subrin notes, “It was thought that there was no other way [other than 
discretion] to avoid problems of technicality inherent in interpreting the Field Code and the 
Throop Code.” Id. at 942. 
56  Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987) 
(“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-
substantive in only the most trivial sense.”); Tidmarsh, supra note 53 (“Paradoxically, how-
ever, the discretion to fashion case-specific rules also threatens trans-substantvism—not at 
the level of formal rule, but at the level of rule implementation in individual cases.”). 
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ently lead to the application of substance-specific process.57 It could simply 
lead to nonuniformity, or similar cases receiving different treatment. 
On the other hand, this discretion can lead to substance-specific process 
when the formally transsubstantive rules are applied, through the use of discre-
tion, consistently one way in some substantive areas, and another way in other 
types of cases.58 Moreover, courts may adopt precedent-setting language in cer-
tain cases concerning the proper application of the rules to a class of cases, 
leading to some formalization of substance specificity.59 As discussed below, 
of the various ways that substance-specific rules may arise, judicial common 
law rules are the hardest to identify and the most structurally problematic. The 
remainder of this article uses litigation under FOIA to exemplify the troubling 
implications. 
II. SPECIAL FOIA PROCEDURES 
FOIA is the public’s primary vehicle for obtaining government-held in-
formation.60 Although it does require limited affirmative disclosure or publica-
tion of government records,61 its hallmark provision embraces a request-and-
response model of making agencies more transparent, requiring the government 
to produce records to any person who asks,62 subject only to nine statutorily 
listed exemptions.63 If the government denies a request for information under 
                                                        
57  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 378. 
58  See David Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1191, 1204. 
59  For example, prior to the Supreme Court weighing in, courts of appeals had fashioned 
substance-specific pleading standards in Title VII cases in precedential opinions that were 
widely followed. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). 
60  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). It certainly, however, is not the only mechanism. For 
instance, the Federal Advisory Committee Act requires certain balance and transparency on 
advisory committees, see 5 U.S.C. Appx. § 5, the Sunshine Act requires certain agency 
meetings to be open to the public, see 5 U.S.C. § 552b, and the Privacy Act requires certain 
personal records to be made available, see id. at § 552a. In addition, informal disclosure—
either with official sanction such as planting information in the press, or without official 
sanction, i.e., leaking—plays a critical role in informing the public about the government’s 
activities. See generally David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Con-
demns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013) 
(describing the various ways in which allowing unauthorized information disclosures serves 
the government’s interests, including by fostering the public’s belief that it will by some 
means learn of any important governmental policies). 
61  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), (2). 
62  Id. at § 552(a)(3)(A). 
63  Id. at § 552(b)(1)–(9). The exemptions cover records that are properly classified for na-
tional security reasons, certain internal records, records exempt from disclosure by other 
statutory provisions, trade secret and confidential commercial and financial information, 
records that would be privileged in civil discovery, records that if released would constitute 
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, certain law enforcement records, certain 
information about financial regulation, and certain information about wells. Id. 
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FOIA, the requester has the right, after exhausting administrative remedies, to 
challenge that denial by bringing a lawsuit in federal court.64 
The same Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern FOIA lawsuits as gov-
ern other civil suits.65 And while FOIA litigation involves a federal agency, it is 
unlike litigation reviewing most other agency actions, review of which is typi-
cally deferential and is confined to the administrative record.66 Instead, whether 
records are exempt from mandatory disclosure under FOIA is a question that is 
determined de novo by the district court on a record created in litigation.67 Ac-
cordingly, it is much more like a host of other statutory rights that can be vindi-
cated in a typical civil suit in federal district court. 
While the same procedural rules apply as a formal matter in FOIA litiga-
tion as in other civil cases, judges have, through the exercise of discretion, con-
sistently applied different processes in practice. That is, as detailed below, 
courts exercise discretion categorically and constrain themselves by applying 
precedent dictating the processes to be applied in FOIA cases. In effect, judges, 
through individual decisions, have made a system of substance-specific proce-
dural rules for FOIA litigation. 
A. Discovery Abolished 
Departure from typical litigation process in FOIA cases begins with dis-
covery. Discovery rules are an area of civil procedure often under attack, in-
cluding for their one-size-fits-all approach, which leads to discovery abuses in 
some cases.68 Overzealous use of discovery and the permissiveness of the dis-
                                                        
64  Id. at § 552(a)(4)(B). 
65  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 81 (describing the applicability of the rules and not listing FOIA 
actions as exempt from their reach). 
66  For a full discussion of the ways in which judicial review of FOIA determinations differs 
from typical agency litigation and instead resembles other civil litigation, see Margaret B. 
Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 196–200 (2013). 
67  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) provides: 
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complain-
ant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or 
in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency rec-
ords and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complain-
ant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents 
of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be 
withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden 
is on the agency to sustain its action. 
68  See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation 
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 553 (2010) (surveying the “escalating problems in the U.S. civil 
discovery system and how they can be remedied”); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Re-
visited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 189, 191–92 (1992) (discussing potential preclusionary rather than monetary sanc-
tions for discovery abuse); Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 635, 648 (1989) (arguing that discovery abuse is a serious problem worth addressing, 
and that it is rooted in excessive uncertainty, allocation of costs, and judicial control); 
Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 403 (describing a 
proposal for simple track litigation in federal court with reduced discovery, citing the prob-
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covery rules may well create some problems that need to be addressed. In 
FOIA cases, however, the problem is the opposite: too little discovery. In fact, 
courts have all but precluded any discovery whatsoever in FOIA litigation. 
An example helps illustrate the special discovery procedures dictated by 
the courts in FOIA cases. Antique aircraft enthusiast Greg Herrick filed a Free-
dom of Information Act request with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”) seeking construction specifications for an antique F-45 aircraft sub-
mitted for regulatory purposes by the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corpora-
tion, maker of the F-45.69 Herrick was himself undertaking to restore an F-45 
aircraft he owned, only sixteen of which were ever built and only approximate-
ly three of which still existed.70 When the FAA denied his request, asserting 
that the records were exempt from FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provision be-
cause they constituted trade secrets, he exercised his right to sue, challenging 
the legality of the FAA’s refusal to disclose the records.71 
One aspect of the litigation that ensued is now well known to civil proce-
dure professors and students alike. After Herrick lost his suit in the district 
court,72 and his appeal to the Tenth Circuit,73 Brent Taylor filed a FOIA request 
with the FAA for the very same records and likewise brought a lawsuit—this 
time in the D.C. District Court—when he failed to receive a response by the 
statutory deadline.74 The D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit both con-
cluded that Taylor’s lawsuit was barred by claim preclusion, or res judicata, on 
                                                                                                                                
lems with excessive discovery). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Per-
vasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemak-
ing, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (arguing that claims of discovery abuse are empirically 
unfounded and rule amendments based on the rhetoric are dangerous for the civil justice sys-
tem). 
69  Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002). 
70  Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1323 (D. Wyo. 2000). 
71  Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1188. 
72  Herrick, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. In particular, the court found that the records included 
“drawings and blueprints required to manufacture the F-45—all materials clearly used in the 
production process for this aircraft and which are the end product of innovation and substan-
tial effort.” Id. at 1328. Applying a common formulation, the court declared that these mate-
rials “do come within the scope of Exemption 4” because they meet the 
definition of trade secret as secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device used 
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be 
said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial effort, with a direct relationship be-
tween the trade secret and the productive process. 
 Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (exempting trade secrets from mandatory disclosure under 
FOIA). 
73  Herrick, 298 F.3d at 1188. The Tenth Circuit rejected Herrick’s three arguments on ap-
peal that the records were not actually owned by the corporate successor to Fairchild, that 
the records were not secret because FAA had been given permission to share them publicly, 
and that the current corporate objection to their release does not constitute a reinstatement of 
secret status. Id. at 1190. 
74  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 887–88 (2008). A failure to receive a response within 
the twenty-business day deadline is deemed a constructive denial and administrative exhaus-
tion of remedies, allowing for immediate filing of suit. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), (a)(6)(C)(i). 
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the theory that Taylor was “virtually represented” in Herrick’s lawsuit because 
of the two plaintiffs’ prior relationship, membership in the same antique air-
craft association (of which Taylor was the president), and representation by the 
same attorney.75 The Supreme Court took the case, definitively barring the doc-
trine of virtual representation and holding a strict line on the application of res 
judicata; Taylor’s lawsuit could proceed.76 
While the Supreme Court’s opinion was an important one in the area of 
claim preclusion, another aspect of the litigation—a discovery battle that oc-
curred at the district court level—should also cause proceduralists to pause. 
Prior to the case’s ascent to the high court, it had begun as typical civil litiga-
tion. Taylor filed a complaint alleging the FAA had failed to respond to his re-
quest,77 and the parties agreed to stay the litigation while the FAA produced a 
response.78 When the FAA arrived at a response denying Taylor access to the 
records, it then answered the complaint.79 Taylor then served discovery re-
quests on the FAA.80 
It was clear from the outset that the crux of the case on the merits would 
turn on whether the requested records had actually been maintained as confi-
dential, a necessary condition for a trade secret claim. In fact, a 1955 letter 
from Fairchild authorized the government to loan out the data to anyone for the 
purpose of making repairs or replacement parts without the need for prior per-
mission, raising serious questions about the confidentiality of these records.81 
Accordingly, Taylor’s discovery requests focused on gathering information 
about whether the records had been maintained confidentially or whether they 
had been previously disclosed to third parties.82 
                                                        
75  Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965, 969–71 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The D.C. Circuit declared that: 
For a party to be deemed the “virtual representative” of a party to a later suit making the 
same claim, the two parties must have the same interests and those interests must have been ad-
equately represented in the first litigation. In addition, there must be a close relationship between 
the two, or the new party must have participated substantially in the prior litigation or engaged 
in tactical maneuvering to avoid the preclusive effects of the first decision. 
Id. at 978. 
76  Taylor, 553 U.S. at 904. 
77  Freedom of Information Act Complaint at 2, para. 7, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173), 2003 WL 24057317. 
78  Minute Order Granting Joint Motion to Stay, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (No. 03-00173). 
79  Defendant’s Answer, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173), 
2003 WL 24057522. 
80  Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Discovery (filed Jan. 5, 2004), Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 
965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173) [hereinafter Taylor Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion]. 
81  Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002). 
82  See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Discovery, Taylor v. Blakey, 
490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173). For instance, the proposed interrogatories 
included, with the 1955 letter, “Did this letter authorize public access to and borrowing of 
the plans and specifications which the Federal Aviation Administration (or its predecessor 
agency) keeps on file that support the type certificates for certain Fairchild Aircraft, includ-
ing the F-45 Aircraft?” and “If it is contended that this letter was rescinded, or withdrawn, 
state the date of such rescission or withdrawal, and identify the document(s) you contend 
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 What happened next took an unusual turn. After requesting that the parties 
submit a status report on the case, the court announced that Taylor would need 
to file a motion for leave to take discovery, and that the FAA therefore need not 
respond to the already-served discovery requests or file a motion for a protec-
tive order with respect thereto.83 The rationale for this order was simply that 
discovery is not ordinarily permitted in a FOIA case.84 
Taylor’s quest to access basic discovery tools did not encounter merely an-
other procedural hurdle, but what would become a procedural roadblock. Tay-
lor filed the requested motion to allow discovery, documenting the need for 
discovery to establish whether the records were maintained confidentially or, 
alternatively, how the government reclaimed confidentiality of records that 
were in the public domain as a result of the 1955 letter.85 But the request for 
discovery was denied as premature, the court declaring that “discovery should 
only occur after the government has moved for summary judgment and submit-
ted its supporting affidavits and memorandum of law.”86 
Taylor’s discovery battle did not end there. Shortly after the initial discov-
ery order, the Fairchild Corporation, a corporate successor to the manufacturer 
of the F-45, intervened as a defendant, and litigation over the claim preclusion 
question ensued.87 Once the Supreme Court allowed the case to proceed, how-
ever, it was remanded to the district court and again stood in the posture of a 
case where nothing more than pleadings had been completed.88 Taylor accord-
                                                                                                                                
effect such withdrawal or rescission?” and “Does the Federal Aviation Administration main-
tain a record(s) of persons who have been given access to the requested information and, if 
so, how far back that record(s) go. State the names, addresses and dates of access.” Taylor 
Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion, supra note 80, at Exhibit Plaintiff’s Interrogatories to Defend-
ant at 3. 
83  Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 
to Allow Discovery at 4, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173), 
2003 WL 24057524 (“During a telephone conference with the parties and a law clerk in at-
tendance on or about December 11, 2003, the parties were told that, in the circumstances of 
this case and because discovery is not ordinarily permitted in a FOIA case, plaintiff would 
need to file a motion seeking discovery. It was agreed that defendant need not file a motion 
for a protective order pertaining to discovery, because the Court had not yet ruled that plain-
tiff was entitled to discovery.”). 
84  Id. 
85  Taylor Plaintiff’s Discovery Motion, supra note 80. 
86  Memorandum Opinion Denying the Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery at 4, Taylor v. Bla-
key, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173). The court further explained: “A ra-
tionale for waiting for the government’s motion and supporting documents is that, prior to 
receiving these materials, the court has insufficient information to determine the applicabil-
ity of the FOIA exemption at issue.” Id. at 4–5. 
87  Motion to Intervene, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173). 
88  See Joint Status Report at 1, Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-
00173) (explaining that the effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling was to allow the case to 
move forward with next steps, to wit, any possible discovery and then to summary judgment 
motions). 
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ingly renewed his motion to allow discovery.89 He again advanced arguments 
about the need for discovery, this time focusing on the need to gather infor-
mation that would shed light on the truth or falsity of a key affidavit, one that 
evidenced apparent weakness in the personal knowledge of the affiant, among 
other problems.90 
Again, however, Taylor’s efforts to access discovery were denied.91 This 
time, the court acknowledged Taylor’s concern that without discovery, he 
would be “unable to effectively oppose a potential motion for summary judg-
ment,” but concluded that the “appropriate mechanism for the plaintiff to seek 
such relief, however, is through a Rule 56(f) motion”92 filed after the govern-
ment files for summary judgment.93 “At that point,” the court declared, it 
would have “the opportunity to review the merits of the defendants’ exemption 
claim and [would] be better suited to make a discovery ruling.”94 Accordingly, 
Taylor had no choice but to proceed to the summary judgment stage of the case 
having had no opportunity whatsoever to use discovery to gather evidence that 
may help him win his own motion or defeat that of the government.95 
The court in Taylor’s case did not invent these discovery rules out of thin 
air. In fact, the court’s decision is in keeping with a long history of decisions 
enumerating special discovery processes—namely, a presumptive discovery 
ban—in FOIA cases. Courts have boldly declared: “[D]iscovery is an extraor-
dinary procedure in a FOIA action;”96 “When the courts have permitted dis-
covery in FOIA cases, it is generally limited to the scope of the agency’s 
search;”97 “Discovery is generally unavailable in FOIA actions;”98 and “FOIA 
actions typically do not involve discovery.”99 This per se blanket rule is some-
                                                        
89  Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Discovery (filed Apr. 28, 2009), Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 
965 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 03-00173). 
90  Id. at 4–5. In particular, this motion detailed that the affiant, the Executive Vice President, 
General Counsel and Corporate Security of the Fairchild Corporation, had twice sought to 
evade service of a subpoena for a deposition in the previous Herrick case, and that, based on 
the circumstances, it was unlikely he had personal knowledge about the records in question 
and that his characterization of the records was conflicted in some aspects with the FAA’s 
characterization. Id. 
91  Taylor v. Babbitt, 673 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2009). 
92  Id. Rule 56(f) has been recodified at FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), and provides that: 
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present 
facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny 
it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other 
appropriate order. 
93  Taylor, 673 F. Supp. at 23. 
94  Id. 
95  See id. 
96  Thomas v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Food and Drug Admin., 587 F. Supp. 2d 
114, 115 n.2 (D.D.C. 2008). 
97  El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 301 (D Conn. 2008). 
98  Wheeler v. CIA, 271 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (D.D.C. 2003). 
99  People for the Am. Way Found. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 308 (D.D.C. 
2007). 
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times explained as emanating from a presumption that agencies tell the truth: 
“Affidavits submitted by an agency are ‘accorded a presumption of good faith,’ 
accordingly, discovery relating to the agency’s search and the exemptions it 
claims for withholding records generally is unnecessary if the agency’s submis-
sions are adequate on their face.”100 That is, except in extraordinary circum-
stances, no testing of the veracity of agency affidavits in FOIA cases is al-
lowed. 
Typically, in other civil litigation, courts are extremely hesitant to grant 
motions for summary judgment before a party has had an adequate opportunity 
to take discovery.101 In fact, one treatise describes how courts “have wisely 
hesitated to grant a motion for summary judgment before the nonmovant has 
had an adequate opportunity to complete discovery concerning the matters 
raised in the summary judgment motion.”102 The rules even provide the pre-
sumptive deadline for filing such a motion as thirty days after discovery has 
ended, and list the types of evidence that may be used to support the motion as 
precisely the types of evidence gleaned in discovery: depositions, documents, 
electronically stored information, admissions, and interrogatory answers, 
among others.103 Accordingly, for proceduralists, it goes nearly without saying 
that summary judgment is designed to resolve cases in which there are no 
genuine issues of material fact based upon the evidence obtained during dis-
covery. 
Thus, perhaps even more bizarre than FOIA decisions that declare a ban on 
discovery is another common refrain, echoed in the Taylor case, which declares 
that in FOIA cases discovery is not permitted until after summary judgment 
motions have been made and denied. As the Eleventh Circuit declared: “The 
plaintiff’s early attempt in litigation . . . to take discovery depositions is inap-
propriate until the government has first had a chance to provide the court with 
the information necessary to make a decision on the applicable exemptions.”104 
In one typical D.C. District Court decision, the court oddly asserted that wheth-
er a FOIA case “warrants discovery is a question of fact that can only be de-
termined after the defendants file their dispositive motion and accompanying 
affidavits.”105 Thus, the rules of discovery are held to operate differently in 
                                                        
100  Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing Safecard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
101  See EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.7 
(2014) (“Indeed, some decisions unequivocally assert that an award of summary judgment is 
premature if the nonmovant has not had a chance to commence discovery.”). 
102  Id.; see also Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1844 (describing that the rules, by design, 
gave judges “the authority to enter a summary judgment after the discovery of relevant facts 
and before a trial only in very limited circumstances”). 
103  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b), (c)(1). 
104  Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993). 
105  Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D.D.C. 1980); see also Krieger v. Fadely, 199 
F.R.D. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2001) (explaining that discovery in FOIA cases should “ordinarily 
occur after the government moves for summary judgment”); cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 65 (D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that rather than allow the 
1508 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1493 
FOIA cases than in other civil litigation, and judges expressly rely on their dis-
cretion to fashion these substance-specific rules.106 
That is not to say that discovery in FOIA cases is never allowed, but that 
unlike other cases, plaintiffs must make motions and convince a court—usually 
having to demonstrate egregious misconduct by the government—before they 
are granted the right to use discovery tools. For instance, in Citizens for Re-
sponsibility and Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
the D.C. District Court allowed limited discovery in circumstances where the 
agency’s own declarations suggested it had destroyed relevant records, the 
agency subsequently admitted some statements in its own declarations were 
false, and the agency withheld relevant information from the plaintiffs as a re-
sult of litigation tactics.107 In other cases where discovery was allowed, the rec-
ord already contained strong indications of agency bad faith or the agency 
failed to produce facially adequate affidavits.108 The high hurdles for the excep-
tions prove the general rule, however, that discovery is almost never allowed in 
a FOIA case, despite its formal availability under the rules. 
Not only do courts uniformly come down against discovery in FOIA cases, 
these special procedural standards have been codified in precedential opinions 
of circuit courts. Very early in FOIA’s history, in Goland v. CIA, the D.C. Cir-
cuit ruled that where the plaintiff had made no showing of bad faith and the 
agency affidavit was facially adequate, the district court did not err in denying 
the plaintiff the opportunity for discovery.109 The District Court for the District 
of Columbia, bound by D.C. Circuit precedent, hears a vastly disproportionate 
number of FOIA cases, amounting to nearly 40 percent of all such cases na-
tionwide.110 In fact, Goland has been cited for its discovery ruling nearly a 
hundred times.111 Other circuits have followed suit. The Second Circuit, citing 
Goland, has held that “discovery relating to the agency’s search and the ex-
emptions it claims for withholding records generally is unnecessary if the 
                                                                                                                                
FOIA plaintiff discovery after the denial of a summary judgment motion, “when an agency’s 
affidavits or declarations are deficient regarding the adequacy of its search, as they are here, 
the courts generally will request that the agency supplement its supporting declarations”). 
106  For example, in Taylor, the court in denying discovery cited Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1980) for the proposition that “courts have ample au-
thority to set limitations to protect agencies from oppressive discovery.” Taylor v. Babbitt, 
673 F. Supp. 2d 20, 23 (D.D.C. 2009). 
107  Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t Veterans Affairs, 828 F. 
Supp. 2d 325 (D.D.C. 2011). 
108  See, e.g., Landmark Legal Foundation v. EPA, 959 F. Supp. 2d 175, 184 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(citing a failure to search relevant records and evidence the agency purposefully attempted to 
“skirt disclosure under the FOIA”); Long v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 10 F. Supp. 2d 205, 210 
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting discovery because the affidavits did not reasonably describe the 
search). 
109  Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
110  Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217, 261 
(2011). 
111  Goland, 607 F.2d at 339 at West Headnotes 9, 11. 
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agency’s submissions are adequate on their face.”112 The Ninth Circuit has de-
clared that while normally discovery is available to any party, in FOIA cases 
“courts may allow the government to move for summary judgment before the 
plaintiff conducts discovery.”113 The Eleventh Circuit has stated that FOIA 
plaintiffs’ attempts to take discovery are “inappropriate until the government 
has first had a chance to provide the court with the information necessary to 
make a decision on the applicable exemptions.”114 These precedent-setting rul-
ings do not merely apply the individualized exercise of discretion to particular 
FOIA cases, but instead announce deviations from the Federal Rules that apply 
in a single substantive area. 
B. Trials Denied 
Substance specificity in FOIA procedure does not end with discovery, but 
also permeates the method of arriving at ultimate decisions in FOIA cases 
through unique applications of summary judgment. The formal summary 
judgment standard prescribes, of course, that judgment should only to be en-
tered when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”115 Facts are material if they might 
affect the outcome of the case,116 and disputes as to those facts are genuine if a 
reasonable fact finder could find in favor of either party.117 Any genuine dis-
putes of material fact would preclude judgment being entered for either party 
and would require, instead, a trial. 
To be sure, the charge has been made as a general matter that summary 
judgment is too often used to resolve fact disputes that could affect the out-
come, and that the power of summary judgment may be invading the province 
of the trier of fact.118 These critiques of the use of summary judgment generally 
                                                        
112  Carney v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994). 
113  Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008). 
114  Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993). 
115  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  
116  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986). 
117  Id. at 247–48, 252 (requiring more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” on 
both sides). 
118  See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper 
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 203 (1993) 
(contending that summary judgment is being inappropriately used to resolve questions of 
fact in civil rights cases to the detriment of plaintiffs); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to 
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Erod-
ing Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 982 (2003) 
(expressing “concern that courts have extended the use of summary judgment and the mo-
tion to dismiss to resolve disputes that are better left to trial and the jury”); Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judg-
ment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 190 (1988) (ar-
guing that the 1986 so-called summary judgment trilogy inappropriately increases the power 
of the judge over the jury); Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1897, 1945 (1998) (“In sixty years summary judgment has grown from a wobbly infant to an 
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to resolve civil lawsuits are important to potential reforms to our procedural 
system as a whole.119 
As to FOIA cases, however, the problem of courts resolving material fact 
disputes on summary judgment motions has reached a different level, both in 
degree and in kind. First, as a matter of degree, empirical evidence suggests 
that FOIA cases go to trial significantly less frequently than other civil cases.120 
In FOIA litigation, over a thirty-year period, only 0.71 percent of all cases were 
resolved by trial.121 By contrast, as to other civil cases over the same time peri-
od, trials resolved 3.44 percent of lawsuits.122 In fact, not only are the numbers 
low, they have been falling precipitously; it is fair to say that in the last ten 
years, there have been essentially no FOIA trials.123 In place of trials, the num-
bers also strongly suggest that the cases that otherwise would go to trial are 
overwhelmingly being resolved by summary judgment.124 
Second, the absence of FOIA trials is not surprising in light of the special 
procedural rules courts have adopted for using summary judgment in FOIA 
cases. Courts are quick to explain that summary judgment is not simply one 
way of deciding FOIA cases, but rather is the preferred or presumptively ap-
propriate way to decide them. They describe the use of summary judgment in 
FOIA cases by saying: “FOIA cases are generally and most appropriately re-
solved on motions for summary judgment;”125 “Summary judgment is the pro-
cedural vehicle by which nearly all FOIA cases are resolved;”126 “FOIA actions 
                                                                                                                                
aggressive gatekeeper to access to trial—by jury or otherwise”). It has even been argued that 
summary judgment is a wholly unconstitutional violation of the Seventh Amendment right to 
trial by jury. Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 139 (2007). 
119  See, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 2, at 1852–53 (describing how a shift in summary 
judgment practice that increases its prevalence over trials is an element of a new era of civil 
procedure that should be judged as a whole). 
120  Kwoka, supra note 110, at 260. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 257–58 & n.222. There is one notable exception, which is a FOIA case concerning 
trade secret information in which the business submitter intervened as a defendant and the 
case was resolved via a true bench trial. See In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 656 
F. Supp. 2d 68, 70 (D.D.C. 2009). 
124  Kwoka, supra note 110, at 260. Among other civil cases, resolution by motion occurred 
12.08 percent of the time, while in FOIA cases, motions resolutions accounted for 38.09 per-
cent of all cases. Id. While the motions resolutions numbers reported include more than 
merely summary judgment motions because of the data collection methods by the Federal 
Judicial Center, for FOIA cases summary judgment almost certainly dominates because 
agencies must submit affidavits to support claims of exemption and are unable to move for a 
judgment on the pleadings or to dismiss. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (explaining the requirements for an affidavit submitted by the agency in a FOIA 
case). 
125  Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement Agency, 
811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
126  L.A. Times Commc’ns, LLC v. Dep’t of the Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 893 (C.D. Cal. 
2006). 
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are typically and appropriately resolved on summary judgment;”127 and “Sum-
mary judgment is the preferred procedural vehicle for resolving FOIA dis-
putes.”128 
The implication of resolving nearly all FOIA cases on summary judgment 
motions is that any factual disputes that do exist and that would or could affect 
the outcome of the case will be resolved on summary judgment motions, not 
through the full trial process involving live witness testimony, cross examina-
tion, and oral arguments.129 While courts seem to think that this result is appro-
priate because FOIA cases hardly ever involve factual disputes,130 the reality is 
that whether exemptions apply to certain records often involves a factual in-
quiry.131 For example, whether records were prepared to aid in making a deci-
sion or to defend a decision already made might not be apparent from the face 
of the record, but may make all the difference as to whether records fall under 
the deliberative process privilege.132 Or, as in Taylor’s case, whether records 
have been disclosed previously may wholly change the outcome on a claim of 
commercial confidentiality.133 
As with discovery rules, in fashioning special summary judgment rules for 
FOIA cases, courts are not merely applying the summary judgment standard on 
an individual basis and tending to find that it resolves most cases. Rather, dis-
trict courts are following circuit precedent directing them to use summary 
judgment to resolve essentially all FOIA disputes, regardless of their nature. 
For example, the Eleventh Circuit minced no words in declaring that, 
“[g]enerally, FOIA cases should be handled on motions for summary judgment, 
once the documents in issue are properly identified.”134 The D.C. Circuit 
(again, perhaps the most influential court in the area of FOIA law) has ex-
plained that “we have created exceptions to the normal summary judgment re-
view processes applicable to litigation under [FOIA],” and that at the summary 
                                                        
127  Landmark Legal Foundation v. EPA, 959 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180 (D.D.C. 2013). 
128  Adamowicz v. IRS, 552 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
129  I have explained elsewhere the probable detriment to FOIA plaintiffs that results from 
this lack of procedural opportunities. Kwoka, supra note 110, at 264–76. 
130  See, e.g., Shannahan v. IRS, 637 F. Supp. 2d 902, 912 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (“The usual 
summary judgment standard does not extend to FOIA cases because the facts are rarely in 
dispute and courts generally need not resolve whether there is a genuine issue of material 
fact.”). 
131  For a full accounting of the most common types of factual inquiries in FOIA cases, see 
Kwoka, supra note 110, at 227–44. 
132  Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (requir-
ing that records be both “predecisional” and “deliberative” to be exempt on the basis of the 
deliberative process privilege); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012) (exempting from 
FOIA’s mandatory disclosure provisions any records that would ordinarily be privileged 
from discovery in civil litigation against the agency). 
133  See Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (“In response the govern-
ment argues that only actual public disclosure of the documents would eliminate their ‘se-
cret’ nature.”). 
134  Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 369 (11th Cir. 1993). 
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judgment stage, “[w]hen the district court reviews an agency’s [affidavit] to 
verify the validity of each claimed exemption, its determination resembles a 
fact-finding process.”135 
Perhaps even more strikingly, however, is that five circuits have rejected in 
the FOIA context the otherwise applicable de novo standard of appellate re-
view for district court’s summary judgment orders; instead, they acknowledge 
the fact-finding inherent in the district courts’ summary judgment decisions by 
reviewing them for clear error.136 In essence, courts have, through precedential 
decisions, effectively revised the Federal Rule governing summary judgment in 
the FOIA context to allow district courts to resolve factual disputes presented 
in summary judgment motions. 
The anomalies of summary judgment procedures in FOIA cases do not end 
there. Take, for example, the case of Eduardo Benavides. Benavides, a federal 
prisoner, filed FOIA requests with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for record-
ings of telephone conversations between himself and his attorney that occurred 
while he was incarcerated.137 BOP denied his request, claiming, among other 
things, that the records fell within FOIA’s law enforcement exemption to man-
datory disclosure, and he filed a lawsuit challenging that claim.138 The govern-
ment promptly moved for summary judgment,139 and Benavides cross-moved 
for summary judgment in his favor.140 
A central dispute in the case was the application of the law enforcement 
exemption.141 In FOIA litigation, the burden is on the government to show that 
an exemption applies.142 As to a law enforcement exemption claim, one essen-
                                                        
135  Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
136  The Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh articulate the standard of review for summary 
judgment decisions in FOIA cases as applying a de novo standard to legal conclusions and 
clear error to factual findings. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 
1993); Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Lane v. Dep’t of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008); News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1189 (11th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit articulates its 
standard of review as first determining if there is an adequate factual basis for the district 
court’s decision and then reviewing the decision as a whole for clear error. Enviro Tech 
Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 371 F.3d 370, 373–74 (7th Cir. 2004). 
137  Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143 (D.D.C. 2011). 
138  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012). Specifically, BOP invoked exemption 7(C), which covers 
records that are compiled for law enforcement purposes and the release of which “could rea-
sonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Defendant’s 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment at 
10, Benavides, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141 (No. 09-2026) [hereinafter Benavides Summary Judg-
ment Memo]. The personal privacy concerns the BOP invoked were those of Benavides’s 
attorney, the other party on the telephone calls. Id. at 12. 
139  Benavides Summary Judgment Memo, supra note 138. 
140  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of His Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Be-
navides, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141 (No. 09-2026). 
141  See id. at 5–10. 
142  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4). 
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tial element is a demonstration that records are compiled “for law enforcement 
purposes,”143 which requires the government to “identify a particular individual 
or incident as the object of the investigation and specify the connection of the 
individual or incident to a potential violation of law or security risk.”144 To 
meet its burden to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that the records in question were compiled for law enforcement purposes, BOP 
submitted an affidavit that averred, in relevant part, that BOP has various en-
forcement powers and is “tasked with the law enforcement mission of protect-
ing inmates, staff, and the community.”145 It further averred that recordings of 
telephone conversations are made “for the purpose of monitoring inmate tele-
phone activity and conducting investigations regarding violations of illegal ac-
tivites or suspected illegal activities being conducted, coordinated or directed 
from within a BOP facility.”146 However, as the district court later found, the 
affidavit “neither identifie[d] a particular individual or incident subject to an 
investigation nor connect[ed] a particular individual or incident to a potential 
violation of law.”147 That is, the court concluded that the government offered 
no evidence whatsoever that could allow a reasonable fact-finder to find in its 
favor on an essential element of its claim. 
Were the case decided according to typical Rule 56 standards, the failure of 
the party with the burden of proof to produce any evidence on an essential ele-
ment of a claim at the summary judgment stage would be fatal, resulting in 
judgment entered for the opposing party.148 Rather than grant Benavides’s mo-
tion, however, the court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment as 
to the law enforcement exemption claim, specifying that only the BOP’s mo-
tion was denied without prejudice to refile.149 That is, the party who bore the 
burden of proof and failed to produce any evidence to meet that burden re-
ceived more favorable treatment by being allowed to rewrite its affidavits and 
try for summary judgment again. In essence, if the government fails to come up 
with sufficient evidence on its first try in a FOIA case, it will be allowed what I 
have termed elsewhere a “do-over.”150 
Admittedly, the precedential appellate case law on this question is some-
what more mixed than is the case with other special FOIA procedures. At one 
                                                        
143  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
144  Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 774 F. Supp. 2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Davin 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1056 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
145  Declaration of Larry Collins, Attachment to Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, at para. 17, Benavides, 774 F. 
Supp. 2d 141 (No. 09-2026). 
146  Id. at para. 15. 
147  Benavides, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 147. 
148  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”). 
149  Benavides, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 147. 
150  Kwoka, supra note 66, at 231–33. 
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point, the D.C. Circuit went out of its way to affirm the decision of the district 
court to order immediate release of records as to which the government had 
produced an inadequate affidavit supporting exemption, rather than allowing 
the government a second try.151 At best, however, the circuits have given high-
ly mixed signals. The D.C. Circuit has also held that “in camera review may be 
particularly appropriate when . . . the agency affidavits are insufficiently de-
tailed,” suggesting that entry of judgment against the government is hardly the 
first recourse in such a situation.152 The First Circuit has admitted having “cau-
tioned against ordering immediate disclosure of documents based on an agen-
cy’s admittedly flawed affidavit,” but has also, in another case, upheld the de-
nial of a second chance to the agency.153 In another circumstance, the Third 
Circuit has squarely held that it is error not to consider revised affidavits when 
the initial ones fail.154 While the circuit courts may be sending somewhat 
mixed signals, the intonation of the decisions suggests that the safest recourse 
is to permit the government another chance, and the district courts are consist-
ently allowing do-overs in FOIA cases.155 
Taken together, summary judgment procedures in FOIA cases depart dras-
tically from summary judgment in other substantive areas of the law. District 
courts follow circuit precedent requiring the presumptive use of summary 
judgment—not the presumptive use of trial—to resolve all FOIA disputes. 
Moreover, courts routinely condone and encourage district courts to allow the 
government, the party with the burden of proof, multiple attempts at producing 
sufficient evidence to survive, or even win, a summary judgment motion. 
Summary judgment has thus become a substance-specific practice for FOIA 
litigation. 
III. COSTS TO THE JUDICIARY 
As the previous part demonstrated, courts have created through a common 
law type process a special set of procedures used to decide cases brought under 
FOIA. These processes deviate not only from the processes used in other cases, 
but from the codified Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves. Debates 
over the merits of substance-specificity have abounded in the literature.156 And 
certainly, some substance-specific procedural rules may be sound policy in par-
ticular instances.157 
                                                        
151  Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
152  Quiñon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
153  State of Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 73 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing Irons 
v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1979)). 
154  Coastal States Gas Corp v. Dep’t of Energy, 644 F.2d 969, 980 (3d Cir. 1981). 
155  Kwoka, supra note 66, at 233 & n.307. 
156  For examples of arguments against substance-specificity, see note 32 (citing sources). 
157  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and 
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 831–32 (1986) (“I 
hope that my analysis of problems created by the application of trans-substantive preclusion 
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FOIA litigation may even be ripe for substance-specific processes (albeit, 
likely not those described above).158 That said, because of the way that these 
procedural rules for FOIA have been created—eschewing the legislative or 
rulemaking process—they create significant costs, which can be grouped into 
three categories. First, the creation of substance-specific rules in this fashion 
undermines the legitimacy of the judiciary. Second, the process used results in 
rules themselves that are substantively flawed and fail to advance Congress’s 
goals in enacting FOIA. And third, the perception on both sides—from the ju-
diciary and the litigants—that the litigation process is not working to resolve 
FOIA disputes has led to the beginning stages of a movement to relocate FOIA 
dispute resolution to alternative non-judicial venues. All three of these down-
sides implicate institutional concerns of the third branch. 
A. Loss of Legitimacy 
So-called “neutrality” of procedural rules has been lauded as a virtue to be 
embraced.159 The word neutrality, however, must be carefully defined in this 
context. Neutrality as to substantive outcomes, such that the procedural rules 
are not favoring one side or the other of particular substantive disputes, while 
never perfect, is typically the type of neutrality sought with respect to pro-
cess.160 Procedural rules surely embody other types of value judgments—about 
the value of certain process to truth seeking, justice, efficiency, acceptability, 
etc.—but not the same sorts of value judgments policymakers engage in when 
determining substantive rights and remedies.161 
The reform movement resulting in the Federal Rules embraced the idea 
that neutrality was a central goal. For instance, rulemaking authority was 
placed principally with the Supreme Court, an institution seen as least suscepti-
ble to political pressure.162 In addition, the Rules Enabling Act dictated neutral-
                                                                                                                                
rules will contribute to the reconsideration of some of the basic [transsubstantivity] assump-
tions of modern procedural systems.”); Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 1, at 28 (making a 
case for “selective substance-specific procedure,” particularly with regards to discovery). 
158  I have described the costs of the current version of specialized procedures in FOIA else-
where. See Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery, and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060 
(2014) (documenting a litigation paradox wherein deference, including through special pro-
cesses, is given agency decisions, but agencies are not constrained by another key adminis-
trative law principle, the Chenery principle, requiring them to defend their actions on the 
rationale stated at the time the decision was made); Kwoka, supra note 66, at 200 (explain-
ing how these and other specialized procedures contribute to deference to government claims 
of secrecy and undermine transparency laws). 
159  See Carrington, supra note 31, at 2074. 
160  See id. (“Neutrality with respect to the interests of particular groups of disputants is an 
obvious objective, indeed perhaps a paramount value, of any enterprise engaged in dispute 
resolution.”). 
161  See Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 380 (“If value is defined as a 
choice of substantive policy, a law is value-neutral if it does not directly regulate conduct ‘at 
the stage of primary private activity.”). 
162  Carrington, supra note 31, at 2075. 
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ity, mandating that the rules not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.”163 And, importantly, the Rules were expressly designed to be transsub-
stantive, applying equally to “all civil actions and proceedings in the United 
States district courts.”164 
Transsubstantivity itself is a principle of neutrality that deserves special at-
tention. When one rule must govern all cases, the likelihood that a particular 
substantive goal motivates the design of the rule is diminished; after all, if a 
rulemaker disfavors a particular type of claim, making a rule that would hinder 
its advancement would also hinder the advancement of all other types of 
claims, including the ones that the rulemaker may favor.165 As Professor Subrin 
has declared, “we now know that once one starts debating which procedures 
are best for which types of cases, it becomes obvious that political decisions are 
being made.”166 
The fact that substance-specific rules may reflect underlying policy choices 
does not necessarily make such rules inadvisable, but it does have important 
implications about who should have the power to engage in that type of rule-
making and how those rules should be made.167 Even advocates for substance 
specificity admit that assigning responsibility for “meshing procedure and sub-
stance” to a particular actor is difficult.168 
Professor Marcus has persuasively demonstrated that “trans-substantivity 
strengthened the case for the neutrality of procedural reform, and thus the legit-
imacy of doctrinal development outside political arenas.”169 That is, confining 
courts to transsubstantive rulemaking guards against abuse of the rulemaking 
power they have been granted, because a transsubstantive rule is less likely to 
be motivated by particular political goals.170 As Professor Marcus succinctly 
says, typically, “substance-specific rules must come from the political process,” 
because courts can legitimately generate only transsubstantive rules.171 Thus, 
even the Supreme Court-supervised federal rulemaking process would suffer a 
legitimacy deficit if it ventured far into the territory of substance specificity.172 
                                                        
163  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
164  FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
165  See Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 1, at 384. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. (noting that the initial civil rules Advisory Committee “certainly did not want to raise 
congressional ire by overtly stepping into substantive areas of law—this was the province of 
elected officials”). 
168  Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 1, at 54 (“There is the remaining issue of under whose 
auspices such a meshing of process and substance should take place. This is my place for 
fudging.”). 
169  Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, supra note 58, at 
1210–11. 
170  See id. 
171  Marcus, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 18, at 416. 
172  Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, supra note 58, at 1220, 
1229. Marcus also dubs trans-substantivity a sort of “second best” by constraining process 
law where circumstances prevent the law maker from making legitimate choices. Id. at 1236. 
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Individual courts engaging in a sort of common law process for creating 
substance-specific rules, as is the case in FOIA litigation, stand on even worse 
footing. Even though there is unquestionably federal power to make federal 
procedural rules, that responsibility primarily lies with Congress, except when 
Congress chooses to delegate it to the judiciary.173 And federal courts are, of 
course, not empowered as a general matter to engage in making common 
law.174 Substance-specific procedural rules walk a fine line, and may often 
cross that fine line, into substantive law making. This is particularly true where 
the substance-specific rules made through a common law process conflict with 
the federal rules Congress has adopted through the rulemaking process.175 
Other common law departures from the federal rules have been similarly 
criticized as lacking legitimacy. For example, even prior to Twombly and Iqbal, 
courts regularly imposed a sort of heightened pleading standard in civil rights 
cases, despite the fact that under the Federal Rules, notice pleading applies 
across substantive areas.176 In another instance, courts routinely refused to cer-
tify class action lawsuits brought under the Truth in Lending Act even though 
they met the Rule 23 standards for certification, effectively writing an “excep-
tion” into the rule.177 In each instance, these departures provoked criticism of 
the courts for overstepping their role. 
The concern about judge-made, substance-specific procedure is not merely 
theoretical: social science literature demonstrates that the public’s perception of 
the legitimacy of legal actors hinges largely on whether the process is apparent-
ly fair.178 In determining if a process appears fair, litigants and the public hold 
as a central factor the evident neutrality of the decision maker.179 Whatever the 
merits of substance-specific process in some areas—or even in FOIA litigation 
                                                        
173  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (“For the constitutional provision for a 
federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it con-
gressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts.”). There 
certainly remains some federal common law making power with respect to procedure as to 
which Congress’s ability to override is a matter of some debate. See Amy Coney Barrett, 
Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 833–34 (2008). Here, however, substance-
specific procedural rules not only flirt with the substance/procedure divide, but also collide 
with mandates in the duly enacted federal rules. And in any event, Congress currently exer-
cises vast control over federal court procedure. Id. at 887. 
174  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general 
common law.”). 
175  See Barrett, supra note 173, at 887 (noting agreement that Congress has used the rule-
making power to largely control the procedures of the federal courts). 
176  See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 
(2002) (discussing how federal courts have welcomed heightened pleading standards in cer-
tain situations). 
177  Marcus, Trans-substantivity and the Processes of American Law, supra note 58, at 
1244–45. 
178  For a discussion of how the social science literature on procedural justice applies to 
FOIA litigation, see Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1387, 1419–34 (2015). 
179  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 137–38 (2006). 
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specifically—courts lack the authority to create that set of rules on their own 
through a common law type process. Departing from the transsubstantive rules 
in certain classes of cases opens courts up to attack because it implicates under-
lying value judgments about the substance of the laws themselves, and, conse-
quently, engages in policy decisions that should be reserved for the political 
branches. 
B. Ineffective Procedural Rules Embraced 
Beyond the legitimacy problems courts may face by making substance-
specific procedural rules through a common law process, such a process-
making method is also more likely to result in substantively undesirable rules. 
Courts in individual cases may not be able to take into account the full range of 
information necessary to make good substance-specific rules, and are ill 
equipped to make final policy decisions.180 FOIA litigation provides a good ex-
ample: while courts have correctly identified oddities in FOIA cases that may 
warrant substance-specific rules, they have crafted rules that hinder, rather than 
advance, Congress’s objectives in passing FOIA.181 
The nature of the decision-making exercise in which courts engage im-
pedes good substance-specific procedural rules from emerging. In individual 
cases, courts are presented only with a single circumstance and record concern-
ing that particular dispute.182 They are not presented with the kind of overall 
data or range of issues that might arise in that type of litigation more generally, 
the sort of information that would be considered in the rulemaking process or 
in Congress.183 
For instance, some courts have justified limiting discovery in FOIA cases 
on the basis that “the underlying case revolves around the propriety of reveal-
                                                        
180  Even the Supreme Court, to whom Congress delegated rulemaking power in the Rules 
Enabling Act, implicitly acknowledged its limitations when, acting unilaterally, it created an 
Advisory Committee tasked with actually writing the rules. See David Marcus, Institutions 
and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. 
REV. 927, 931 (describing the origins of the rulemaking process). The Committee decided to 
seek public input as part of the process. Id. 
181  See Kwoka, supra note 66, at 221–35. 
182  Relatedly, Nancy Leong has demonstrated that courts’ rulings are distorted when they 
face issues in only one context, rather than seeing a broad range of contexts for the issue to 
arise. See Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 406 (2012). And Suja Thomas 
has documented how courts ruling on atypical cases are prone to making bad law. Suja A. 
Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases Make Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack of Judicial Restraint 
in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 989, 992 (2013). These are 
further examples of how courts’ narrow views when deciding an individual case can stymie 
good decision making at the macro level. 
183  This type of information would help a decision maker ascertain what are known as legis-
lative facts or “generalized statements about the world that help the court decide questions of 
law and policy.” Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1255, 1265 (2012). 
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ing certain documents.”184 This rationale seems to assume that the only possi-
ble relevant discovery would be the documents themselves, a request for which 
would be an inappropriate end run around the merits of the dispute. Certainly, 
in some cases plaintiffs have made such inappropriate requests.185 Those in-
stances may, however, be coloring courts’ views of the appropriateness of dis-
covery in all cases. Many FOIA disputes will center on issues that are not ap-
parent in the content of the requested records,186 and discovery as to those 
issues may be entirely appropriate, as was the case in Taylor.187 
In addition, courts may draw incorrect conclusions from their observations, 
not having the full policy vetting that goes with legislative rulemaking and pub-
lic participation. In the FOIA context, courts have frequently noted that the 
“lack of knowledge by the party seeing [sic] disclosure seriously distorts the 
traditional adversary nature of our legal system’s form of dispute resolu-
tion.”188 That is certainly true, and yet, this fact led the D.C. Circuit not to seek 
the most disclosure possible from the government (for instance, by permitting 
discovery), but rather by essentially substituting the normal discovery obliga-
tions with a requirement that the government produce a single affidavit known 
as a Vaughn index that lists the withheld records and brief justifications for the 
corresponding claims of exemptions.189 Judge Bazelon dissented, stating: 
“Without discovery, a party to litigation may not have access to facts necessary 
to oppose a motion for summary judgment. This problem is especially acute for 
plaintiffs in FOIA cases.”190 That is, the judges on the D.C. Circuit recognized 
an oddity in FOIA cases—an inherent information imbalance between the par-
ties—but could not agree as to what procedures would best remedy the prob-
lem, a quintessential policy decision. 
Other courts have made assumptions about the nature of FOIA disputes 
that contribute to the overuse of summary judgment and which also do not hold 
up to scrutiny. These courts often assert that FOIA cases involve pure questions 
of law, because once the documents are identified, the only dispute is about the 
applicability of the statutory exemptions to disclosure.191 In reality, however, 
                                                        
184  Lane v. Dep’t of Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008). 
185  Kwoka, supra note 66, at 226 & n.259 (listing cases). 
186  See Kwoka, supra note 110, at 234–44. 
187  See supra notes 74–106 and accompanying text. 
188  Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
189  Id. at 827–28; see also Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352–55 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating 
that if Vaughn index requirements are met, the district court “has discretion to forgo discov-
ery and award summary judgment on the basis of affidavits” and announcing a requirement 
that a plaintiff demonstrate agency bad faith before discovery may be had). 
190  Goland, 607 F.2d at 357 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). 
191  See, e.g., Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Wheth-
er a FOIA exemption justifies withholding a record is a question of law that we review de 
novo.”); Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep’t of the Army, 842 F. Supp. 2d 859, 866 (E.D. Va. 
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1520 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1493 
fact disputes permeate claims of exemption. For instance, the law enforcement 
exemption depends on an agency’s claim about the reason why the record was 
created—something that may not be apparent from the document itself.192 The 
same inquiry—why the record was made—is similarly relevant for the deliber-
ative process privilege.193 And like in Taylor’s case, the trade secrets exemp-
tion may turn on who has already seen the records, another dispute of fact.194 In 
fact, fact disputes can be at the heart of all of the most frequently claimed ex-
emptions to disclosure.195 
Charles Clark, the “architect” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as-
serted that procedure should be the “handmaid and not the mistress” to justice, 
that is, that procedure should serve the ends of the substantive law and nothing 
more.196 Professor Marcus posits that there are specific instances in which 
courts may create substance-specific procedures, including when the circum-
stances suggest the institutional limitations of courts are mitigated or where 
other actors are even more limited in their competency.197 An example of the 
former would be when courts are attempting to achieve the policy objectives of 
the substantive law more accurately by creating a substance-specific proce-
dure.198 This type of substance-specific procedure obtains its legitimacy from 
the underlying legislative decision regarding the substantive area of law.199 
Professor Marcus admits, however, that what advances Congress’s under-
lying objectives may be in the eye of the beholder,200 and FOIA’s substance-
specific procedures, even if well-intentioned, seem to fall far short. Denying 
FOIA plaintiffs access to discovery, subjecting their factual disputes to resolu-
tion at summary judgment, and giving the government multiple bites of the ap-
ple all tilt the playing field in favor of the government.201 This result seems to 
fly in the face of Congress’s underlying policy goals of strong, de novo judicial 
review to achieve maximum government transparency under FOIA.202 
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That court-made, substance-specific procedure in the context of FOIA re-
sults in counterproductive rules may be somewhat a matter of chance. It is al-
ways possible courts will devise rules that in fact advance laudable objectives. 
But the judiciary’s lack of legislative-type information and competency at mak-
ing policy choices suggests that it is unlikely to consistently create desirable 
rules. These institutional limitations council strongly against substance speci-
ficity in rules fashioned by individual judges. 
C. Bypassing the Courts 
A final concern resulting from the tension between the Federal Rules and 
common-law-made, substance-specific procedures is the possibility that the 
system will appear so broken to litigants that judicial remedies will no longer 
be desirable.203 As has been discussed, courts feel that FOIA litigation under 
the Federal Rules is akin to forcing a square peg into a round hole, and have 
fashioned their own procedures.204 Those procedures, in turn, have left litigants 
without effective remedies, and the situation seems untenable from all an-
gles.205 As a result, a trend is emerging toward removing cases from the court 
system in favor of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Formal reform efforts have often focused on shunting cases into alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms.206 Professor Subrin posits that such a move 
should be no surprise in light of the equity-based Federal Rules, which them-
selves embody such broad discretion that formal litigation fails to provide pre-
dictable results.207 As Professor Subrin has said, ADR processes bring attention 
to the fact that certain types of cases may warrant different types of process.208 
Another scholar dubbed this trend a “flight from law.”209 
There has been considerable push to move FOIA dispute resolution to 
some sort of ADR mechanism. In 2007, Congress passed the OPEN Govern-
ment Act, which established the Office of Government Information Services 
(“OGIS”), housed at the National Archives and Records Administration.210 
OGIS is designed to serve as a sort of FOIA ombudsman and provides volun-
tary mediation services for requesters and agencies in disputes.211 
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Separately, the Administrative Conference of the United States, an inde-
pendent research agency designed to improve administrative processes, recent-
ly took up the issue of ADR for FOIA disputes, strongly recommending more 
use of the OGIS mechanism and consideration of ADR in place of litigation.212 
Other academic proposals have gone further and suggested binding arbitration 
mechanisms for FOIA in lieu of litigation.213 
While ADR may be a perfectly fine option for some disputes, it should not 
be the option of last resort simply because litigation is failing to meet its objec-
tives. Strict adherence to formally transsubstantive rules may push courts to 
make their own substance specificity, but they are unlikely to make the most 
effective policy choices. The end consequence may be an undesirable one: the 
wholesale removal of classes of litigation from the court system. 
CONCLUSION 
“Procedure is power, of course, so the stakes of choosing one over the oth-
er produces different winners and losers.”214 The choice of winners and losers 
is all the more direct when crafting substance-specific rules. When we adhere 
too strictly to the principle of transsubstantivity, judges “chafe[] against its 
constraints.”215 This tension has played out in FOIA litigation, resulting in a set 
of substance-specific procedures crafted in a process akin to creating common 
law.216 Not only does this type of substance specificity threaten to undermine 
the legitimacy of the judiciary, but it is unlikely to produce the best policy 
choices and may drive litigants from the courthouse to alternative dispute reso-
lution mechanisms.217 While FOIA litigation represents a small sample of the 
federal docket, the example it provides illustrates the dangers of over-
adherence to transsubstantive design as a formal matter, and sheds light on the 
problems with empowering judges to take substance specificity into their own 
hands. 
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